Compare equities side by side
Stocks breaking to new annual highs
S&P 500 oversold value screener
Relative strength momentum leaders
Upcoming earnings dates & reports
Filter and sort all 500 stocks
Continuous multi-factor scoring & catalyst forensics
Today's biggest gainers and losers
Credit Acceptance Corporation is a specialized subprime auto finance company that originates and services loans exclusively through a dealer network of approximately 13,000 independent used car dealers across the United States. The company targets non-prime borrowers (typically FICO scores 500-600) who cannot access traditional financing, charging APRs typically ranging from 18-24% while retaining substantial credit risk on its balance sheet. CACC's competitive moat stems from proprietary underwriting algorithms developed over 30+ years and a dealer advance payment structure that aligns incentives by requiring dealers to share in loan losses.
CACC originates subprime auto loans through independent dealers using a dealer advance model where dealers receive 60-70% of loan value upfront and earn additional payments as borrowers repay. The company retains 100% of credit risk and services all loans in-house. Profitability derives from the spread between 21% average loan yields and 8-10% blended cost of funds (mix of warehouse lines and term ABS), minus 25-30% expected lifetime credit losses and 8-10% operating costs. The business model requires sophisticated collection capabilities - CACC maintains contact with borrowers every 15-20 days on average and achieves recovery rates 5-8 percentage points higher than industry peers through proprietary skip-tracing and workout strategies. Pricing power stems from serving borrowers with limited alternatives and dealer relationships built over decades.
Consumer loan origination volumes and unit growth - quarterly loan volume trends signal market share gains/losses and future revenue trajectory
Net charge-off rates and collection effectiveness - actual credit performance versus forecast drives earnings surprises and reserve adequacy concerns
Dealer attrition and network health - loss of productive dealers or changes in dealer advance rates impact origination capacity
Funding costs and ABS execution - ability to access securitization markets and spreads on warehouse facilities directly impact net interest margins
Regulatory developments - CFPB actions, state-level APR caps, or changes to repossession laws create headline risk
Regulatory risk from state-level APR caps or CFPB enforcement actions - several states have proposed 36% APR caps that would eliminate CACC's business model in those markets, and CFPB has increased scrutiny of subprime auto lenders for alleged predatory practices
Secular shift toward vehicle subscriptions or ride-sharing reducing auto ownership among target demographic - younger subprime borrowers may increasingly opt for Uber/Lyft versus car ownership, shrinking addressable market
Technology disruption from alternative credit scoring (cash flow underwriting, alternative data) enabling traditional lenders to serve subprime segment more effectively
Increased competition from buy-here-pay-here dealers who vertically integrate financing and keep 100% of economics versus sharing with CACC
Captive finance companies (GM Financial, Ally) expanding subprime programs during strong economic periods, compressing yields and dealer margins
Fintech lenders using digital channels to reach subprime borrowers directly, disintermediating the dealer network
High leverage (4.17x debt/equity) amplifies downside during credit cycles - a severe recession could impair equity by 30-50% through elevated charge-offs
ABS market access risk - inability to securitize loans during market dislocations would force reliance on more expensive warehouse facilities and constrain origination capacity
Concentration risk in loan portfolio - 100% subprime auto loans with no diversification by asset class or geography beyond US
Low current ratio (0.26x) reflects business model where loan receivables are long-duration assets funded with shorter-term debt, creating refinancing risk
high - Subprime auto borrowers are highly sensitive to employment conditions and wage growth. During recessions, charge-offs typically spike from 8% annually to 12-15% as borrowers face job losses and cannot maintain payments. Used car prices also impact loss severity on repossessions - CACC typically recovers 35-40% of principal through vehicle sales. The company's borrowers are disproportionately employed in cyclical sectors (retail, hospitality, construction), amplifying sensitivity to GDP fluctuations. Conversely, strong employment markets drive both higher originations and better credit performance.
Rising rates create a mixed impact. Negatively, CACC's funding costs increase as warehouse lines are floating-rate (SOFR + 250-300 bps) and new ABS issuance reprices higher, compressing net interest margins by 50-100 bps in a rising rate environment. The company has $3.2 billion in debt with approximately 60% floating-rate exposure. Positively, higher rates may reduce competition from banks and captive finance companies that exit subprime lending, potentially improving origination volumes. However, CACC cannot easily reprice existing loans (average 4-year duration), creating a 12-18 month lag before higher-yielding originations offset funding cost increases. The 4.17x debt/equity ratio amplifies interest rate sensitivity.
Extreme - Credit risk is the core business model. CACC retains 100% of loan losses unlike competitors who sell loans or use third-party guarantees. The company's $3.5 billion loan portfolio has an allowance for credit losses of approximately $900 million (25-30% of receivables), reflecting expected lifetime losses. Tightening credit conditions or rising unemployment directly impact charge-offs and provision expense. The business model assumes 70-75% of borrowers will default at some point during the loan term, with profitability dependent on timing and recovery rates. Widening credit spreads also impact ABS execution and funding availability.
value - The stock trades at 2.4x sales and 3.6x book despite 26.6% ROE and 18.9% FCF yield, attracting deep value investors who believe credit losses are over-reserved and the business model is sustainable. The 90% EPS growth and strong recent profitability appeal to value investors finding growth at reasonable prices. However, the business model complexity and credit risk deter growth-at-any-price investors. The stock has no dividend, eliminating income-focused investors. Attracts contrarian investors willing to underwrite subprime credit risk and regulatory uncertainty.
high - Subprime lenders exhibit elevated volatility due to credit cycle sensitivity, regulatory headline risk, and quarterly earnings volatility from provision swings. The stock likely has beta above 1.3x given financial services leverage and subprime exposure. During 2008-2009, subprime auto lenders experienced 60-80% drawdowns. Recent 19.4% three-month return followed by negative one-year return demonstrates volatility. Small float and concentrated institutional ownership can amplify price swings on earnings surprises.
